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Abstract: Sequential search is often costly and time-consuming. The time cost is usually 
unknown ex ante and its presence and duration must be inferred as the search progresses. We 
disentangle the effect of time cost on search behavior from people’s (in)ability to perceive time 
delay between offers. We find that people are able to infer the existence of the time cost, but 
their inference is imperfect. We also compare the effect of time cost with the effect of monetary 
cost and find that the time cost reduces the amount of exerted search, but not as much as the 
monetary cost does. Discriminating between the effects is critical for increasing the empirical 
validity of search models and designing mechanisms capable of improving the quality of 
decisions, especially in unfamiliar or infrequently encountered situations.  
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The opportunity cost is one of the most important concepts introduced by economics. Its 
fundamental component, the value of time, shapes incentives faced by economic agents and 
thus influences their behavior (Becker, 1965; Heckman, 2015). A prominent example where 
the value of time plays a crucial role and determines the extent of the underlying economic 
activity is sequential search. Everyday life sequential search processes of evaluating candidates 
in the hiring process, acquiring and reviewing job offers, or comparing prices are often costly 
and time-consuming and frequently involve time delays. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
people often continue to search for a better deal even though the opportunity cost of their time 
far exceeds the expected increase in payoffs from the additional search.1 Since time is a scarce 
and valuable resource (Goldszmidt et al., 2020), it is crucial to understand how the time search 
cost impacts search behavior and whether people undervalue time when searching for better 
alternatives.  
Monetary search costs have been shown to shorten search in multiple contexts, but not much 
is known about the effect of time search costs. Search theory predicts that an increased search 
cost of any type will lead to shorter search (McCall, 1970; Yeo, 1998). Empirical literature 
provides evidence that, as the monetary search cost (henceforth, monetary cost) increases, 
people do indeed search less (e.g. Kerstholt, 1994; Zwick, Rapoport, Lo & Muthukrishnan, 
2003). However, what if people must devote their time instead of money to searching for better 
alternatives? Search models typically do not stipulate how different types of costs influence 
the length of search activity.2 Theoretically, a higher time cost should decrease search, just as 
a higher monetary cost would. However, apart from its different nature, the time cost is also 
specific in that it is usually ex ante unknown (and thus also less salient) and its presence and 
duration must be inferred after the search commences.  
While there exists indicative evidence that people misallocate time (e.g. Bhui, 2019), not much 
is known about whether time and money constructs influence decisions in a similar way or 
whether their impact is fundamentally different. The existing (and still rather scant) economics 
and psychology literature provides mixed evidence. In certain environments the differences 
between time and monetary effects seem to be substantial, with monetary effects usually 
exacerbating the underlying behavioral tendency. For example, people are more likely to cheat 
when thinking about money than time (Gino & Mogilner, 2014), and are more risk averse 
(Okada & Hoch, 2004) and more susceptible to sunk-cost fallacy (Soman, 2001) when 
allocating money rather than time. They are also more likely to volunteer their time than to 
make monetary donations (Brown, Meer, & Williams, 2019; Lilley & Slonim, 2014). On the 
other hand, in situations where scarcity and poverty play a role (Mullainathan & Shafir, 2013; 
Giné, Townsend & Vickery, 2008; Strayer, Drews & Crouch, 2006) or in scenarios involving 
competition as in an all-pay auction (Breaban, Noussair & Popescu, 2020), the time and 
monetary effects appear to be similar.  
 
1 Examples are plentiful, from lengthy internet search to save a few dollars on lower airfares, hotel deals, or 
consumption goods to attending house viewings and auctions for months on end, a situation common in large 
metropolitan areas with increasing real estate prices.  
2 McCall (1970) states that the length of search activity depends on the opportunity cost of time, which could be 
approximated by the perceived wage rate (Goldman & Johansson, 1978; Lippman & McCall, 1976), suggesting 
that time and monetary costs are theoretically equivalent.  
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Given these diverging results, the implications of time costs for sequential search are not 
obvious. Previous literature also suggests that people are inept at estimating time duration 
(Lorko, Servátka & Zhang, 2019 and 2020). Estimation inaccuracies persist even in repeated 
settings, suggesting skewed perception of time. In addition to the potential discrepancies 
between the effects of time and monetary costs, yet another question arises: Do people perceive 
time costs accurately?  
To study whether people take time costs into account when deciding how long to search, we 
designed a laboratory experiment that allows us to control the decision-making environment 
and draw causal inference. The search task shares many features with the secretary problem.3 
It is framed as selling houses, in which the participants earn payoffs based on the offers they 
accept. The implemented experimental environment parallels everyday life where the search 
process of reviewing and rejecting offers is costly and time-consuming. For example, the seller 
might need to incur a monetary cost to verify the credit of each buyer. In a similar fashion, it 
takes time to obtain the credit scores and to evaluate the conditions of each offer.  
In the experiment, each seller reviews one price offer to buy (henceforth offer) at a time and 
must decide whether to accept or reject it. The offers are drawn from an unknown distribution.4 
The decision cannot be recalled, meaning that, if an offer was rejected, the seller cannot change 
his mind and accept that offer later on. Within this setup, we introduce an unannounced time 
cost, represented by a time delay every time the participant rejects an offer and waits for a new 
one, and compare it to a situation where no search cost is present. The behavior in the former 
case could be influenced by the presence of the time cost and by the ability to perceive the time 
cost and incorporate it into the decision-making process. To separate the effect of time cost 
from the perception abilities, we introduce a treatment in which the time cost is announced 
before the search begins so that the participants do not need to infer it as they make their 
decisions. Finally, by means of a nested experimental design, we establish whether the 
announced time cost affects search to the same degree as the monetary cost. The monetary cost 
is known at the time when the decision to search is made and calibrated to reflect the 
opportunity cost of time of our participants.  
The contribution of our study to the literature on sequential search is three-fold. First, we extend 
the empirical analysis of search behavior into the time domain. While time is implicitly present 
in some studies that vary the time horizon of search (e.g. by changing the number of available 
offers), to the best of our knowledge, no previous empirical study has explicitly considered the 
distinct effect of time cost in any sequential search setting despite the fact that the time cost is 
a prevalent factor in many everyday decisions. Second, unlike the monetary cost, which is 
sometimes known before the search commences (e.g. costs for obtaining credit scores), the 
time cost is usually unknown ex ante. Including an unannounced time delay in our design thus 
bridges the lab with the field and increases the external validity of the experiment by 
introducing a sequential search feature (an unknown cost that must be inferred) present outside 
 
3 See Ferguson (1989) and Freeman (1983) for historical reviews on the secretary problem and its origin. In 
contrast to the classical secretary problem that assumes people derive utility only from the optimal (highest) offer, 
our experiment allows participants to earn money also from sub-optimal choices, instead of zero payoffs when 
anything other than the highest offer is accepted. This design feature parallels typical decisions in that a decision 
maker earns payoffs also from alternatives other than the optimal one, for example if he sells a house for the 
second-highest offer. For further discussions see Bearden et al. (2005, 2006) where participants receive a positive 
payoff that is rank-dependent and Angelovski and Güth (2019) who study search in a cardinal secretary problem. 
4 While a seller might have some knowledge about the real estate market in general, each house has its specificities; 
the aggregate price level may not convey enough information regarding buyers’ values for a particular house. 
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the laboratory. Our third contribution stems from separating the effect of time cost per se from 
people’s (in)ability to perceive time delay between subsequent offers and accounting for it in 
their search behavior. It is important to distinguish between these two effects as they have 
different implications for theoretical modeling of search behavior. Understanding the origins 
of search inefficiencies (e.g. continuing the search when the opportunity cost of time is higher 
than the potential increase in payoffs) will allow to design mechanisms capable of improving 
decision quality, especially in unfamiliar or infrequently encountered situations and when 
decision makers lack experience. Finally, making a distinction between the time cost and 
monetary cost is critical to obtaining empirical information that can guide the process of 
constructing search models with increased empirical validity. 
The data confirm our hypotheses about the impact of monetary and time costs on search length. 
We find that participants reduce the amount of search in the presence of unannounced and 
announced time costs, but not as much as in the presence of monetary cost. We also observe 
less search with the announced time cost than with the unannounced time cost, implying that 
participants perceive the time cost imperfectly. The shorter search results in lower accepted 
offers and thus lower payoffs in the presence of monetary cost, but not in the presence of time 
costs. If we take the calibrated monetary value of time search cost into account, the time costs 
(both announced and unannounced) and the monetary cost reduce the profit in a similar way. 
Our findings imply that not only monetary costs but also time costs should be carefully 
considered when designing policy interventions aimed at reducing market frictions.5 A similar 
argument also applies to improving customer’s experience both in the public and private sector. 
Finally, our observation that people undervalue their time complements a recent empirical 
finding by Goldszmidt et al. (2020) that the U.S. Government undervalues time improvements 
and thus underinvests public resources in time-saving infrastructure, pointing out significant 
inefficiencies in both the public and private sector. 
2. RELATIONSHIP TO THE LITERATURE  
Numerous sequential search situations, in which immediate decisions must be made and cannot 
be revisited, display features of the secretary problem. In the classical secretary problem 
(Gardner, 1960), the decision maker is sequentially presented with a set of n candidates 
interviewed for a single position. There is no recall and the decision maker receives a positive 
payoff only if he selects the best candidate. Each presented candidate is either accepted on the 
spot or not. After acceptance, the search stops. According to the optimal decision rule of the 
classical version of the secretary problem, there are two steps to maximize the probability of 
finding the best candidate. The decision maker first reviews and consequently rejects 1/e (≈ 
0.37 as n approaches infinity) of the candidates and then he accepts a candidate who is better 
than any of the previously rejected candidates; where n is the total number of candidates 
available in the pool and e is the Euler's number ≈ 2.718 (see Lindley, 1961 or Gilbert & 
Mosteller, 1966 for a detailed proof). Given that the first approximately 37% of candidates are 
always rejected, there is a 37% chance that the best candidate is among them and thus happens 
to be rejected. If this is the case, the decision maker who follows the optimal decision rule will 
 
5 For example, unpaid blood donors are 10% more likely to donate again if the waiting time is reduced by 38% 
(Craig et al., 2016). Depending on the implementation costs to the blood collection agency, a relatively straight-
forward intervention can thus increase blood collection and simultaneously improve donors’ experience, resulting 
in higher overall efficiency. 
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keep searching and accept the final candidate (because he could not find a better one), resulting 
in considerable search costs in terms of money and/or time. 
Yeo (1998) theoretically sets up a version of the secretary problem in which he introduces a 
fixed per-candidate interview search cost with positive payoffs from selecting any of the k best 
candidates. The payoffs are increasing with the quality (and thus the rank) of the candidate. 
The objective is then to find the optimal decision rule and use it to evaluate the probabilities of 
success and the proportion of candidates interviewed (i.e. the search length). Yeo concludes 
that, as the search cost increases, it is optimal to decrease search activity. Under certain 
restrictive conditions, unlikely to occur in the field (e.g. a known distribution or an equal 
likelihood of all offers within a particular price range), it is possible to derive acceptable 
thresholds for search with costs (Christian & Griffith, 2016). 
The notion of search cost in economic theory is general and refers to the opportunity cost of 
time which includes explicit costs (associated expenditures) as well as any implicit costs (the 
maximum benefit people could obtain by spending time on another activity). Search costs in 
the traditional models of commodity markets introduce frictions that can result in behavior that 
deviates from the competitive equilibrium (see the reviews by Diamond, 1995 and Stiglitz, 
1989). Within the literature on markets with frictions, the most conceptually related study to 
ours is Bakos (1997). Akin to our research question regarding different search costs, Bakos 
presents a model that separates costs of searching over price and product characteristics in the 
context of an electronic marketplace. However, the nature of costs associated with finding a 
product of, say, better quality or lower price remains the same; what varies is only the amount. 
While our experimental approach also makes a distinction between different types of search 
costs, monetary and time costs differ fundamentally in their very nature and might therefore be 
perceived differently by the person who is searching.  
Previous experimental research provides evidence that search costs can have a significant 
impact on search activity. Seale and Rapoport (1997) present an experiment that closely 
incorporates the main assumptions of the classical secretary problem in the design: a known 
number of candidates presented randomly one at a time, a positive payoff resulting only from 
selecting the overall best candidate, and no recall. Seale and Rapoport show that participants 
stop their search earlier than the optimal decision rule dictates. They also use a simulation to 
demonstrate that the observed search behavior better coincides with the search length predicted 
by the optimal decision rule when a 1% search cost is assumed. Seale and Rapoport thus 
speculate that the early stopping behavior can be explained by the presence of endogenous 
search cost, as the participants might want to finish the experiment in the shortest time possible. 
From this perspective, the time spent on observing and evaluating each candidate can be 
considered a search cost by the participants.  
Early stopping behavior is also found in experiments that relax some of the assumptions of the 
secretary problem. For example, Seale and Rapoport (2000) implement an unknown candidate 
population; Bearden et al. (2005, 2006) allow for rank-dependent payoffs from offers; and 
Zwick et al. (2003) allow for the recall of previously rejected offers.6 Using a 2x2 design, 
Zwick et al. examine the effects of monetary cost size and the size of candidate population. 
Their experimental task is framed as a search for new apartments; the participants earn a payoff 
of $10 if they find the overall best apartment; otherwise, they earn $0. In the treatment with no 
 
6 For the remainder of the paper we use the word ‘offer’ to refer to the choices available to the participants to 
avoid confusion stemming from different experimental designs and framings. 
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search cost, participants stop searching too soon, providing further support for earlier Seal and 
Rapoport (1997) findings. In treatments with search cost, the participants end their search 
sooner than with no search cost. Related to the current study, Hsiao, Kemp and Servátka (2020) 
find that framing the secretary problem as selling houses increases the search length and 
increases payoffs. Hsiao et al.’s study, however, focuses on the impact of context on sequential 
search decisions and thus does not include any types of costs. 
Job search is another prominent example of sequential decision-making. McCall (1970) 
provides an analogous prediction to Yeo (1998) regarding the effect of search cost on job 
search. In McCall’s model, the job seeker knows the distribution of wage offers, the search is 
unlimited, and there is no recall. The job seeker receives one randomly selected wage offer at 
a time and decides whether to reject or accept it. Once the offer is accepted, the search ends 
and the job seeker receives a wage equal to the offer. The job seeker thus considers the current 
wage offer against the prospects of being unemployed and receiving his outside option 
(representing unemployment compensation, welfare payment, and/or leisure benefits) and 
facing the search cost again in the next round(s) to obtain a new draw from the wage 
distribution. McCall shows that a relatively high cost compared to the wage offer encourages 
the job seeker to limit search, holding everything else constant. In the extreme, it might even 
mean that the job seeker prefers to remain unemployed. 
Job search models share several assumptions with the secretary problem, including the random 
presentation of job offers and no recall. Their other features, such as knowledge of the 
distribution of offers and an unbounded search horizon, do not coincide with the classical 
secretary problem. However, despite the difference in assumptions between the job search and 
secretary problems and the resulting difference in decision-making environments, laboratory 
experiments studying job search also find that participants stop searching too soon (e.g. Cox & 
Oaxaca, 1989, 2000). Cox and Oaxaca (2000) experimentally test the job search behavior with 
known and unknown wage distributions, allowing for recall. When the distributions are 
unknown, it is more challenging to find the optimal stopping point of job search, compared to 
the scenario where distributions are known. An offer that is a priori relatively high (“good 
news”) can imply that it is highly probable that the search is from the favorable distribution, 
but at the same time it can look unattractive when it is a posteriori relatively low offer from the 
favorable distribution (“bad news”). Cox and Oaxaca find that people terminate their search 
early with the finding being robust to whether wages are drawn from known or unknown 
distributions. In daily life, seekers usually do not know the underlying distribution. The 
existence of search cost exacerbates the complexity of their decisions as it becomes less clear 
whether it is worth searching longer to get a higher payoff (i.e. whether the benefit from 
additional search will exceed the search cost).   
In summary, that monetary cost shortens search is well documented in both theoretical and 
empirical literature. Sequential search, however, is often time-consuming and one might even 
argue that the time cost is unavoidable. The impact of time cost on search behavior has not 
been tested empirically and because of its different nature, one might wonder whether it is 
behaviorally equivalent to the effect of monetary cost. The main contribution of the current 
paper is therefore identifying how different search costs influence search behavior and, in the 
case of time cost, also distinguishing between whether the effect is driven by people having to 
infer the time cost from the experienced delay when waiting for the next offer and/or the time 





3.1 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
The experiment consists of 2 practice rounds and 10 cumulatively paid rounds. The decision-
making task is framed as selling 10 houses; one house being sold in each round.7 In each round, 
a participant reviews up to 20 offers for the given house, coming from an unknown distribution. 
The offers are presented one at a time and there is no recall. Once an offer appears on the 
screen, the participant decides whether to accept or reject the offer. If the participant has not 
accepted an offer prior to the final (20th) offer, he/she is forced to accept the final offer 
regardless of its value.  
The same 10 sequences (rounds), generated prior to the experiment, were employed for each 
participant in all treatments (see Appendix B for details). Each sequence, including those in the 
practice rounds, was generated in Microsoft Excel by randomly sampling from a uniform 
distribution of the house prices (in thousands of NZD) in each of 10 different Christchurch 
suburbs according to the average of prices and their standard deviations. The price offers were 
presented in experimental currency units (ECUs). The participants were informed that they 
would be paid in cash based on their cumulative payoffs according to the exchange rate of 1000 
ECUs = 1 NZD. The cumulative payoff is the sum of all 10 accepted offers minus the sum of 
search costs from the 10 rounds. 
The experiment consists of four treatments implemented in an across-subject design. All 
subject groups are disjoint, and no subject participated in more than a single session. In the 
baseline no cost treatment (henceforth No Cost), the price offers are presented without any 
(time or monetary) search cost being imposed. 8  In the monetary search cost treatment 
(henceforth Monetary Cost), each participant has to pay 20 ECUs to obtain each new offer. The 
monetary cost is cumulative, i.e. the more offers the participant obtains, the higher the sum that 
he/she has to pay in total. For example, if the participant accepts the 20th offer for a house, the 
total monetary cost in this round is 20 x 20 ECUs = 400 ECUs.  
Ex ante it is unclear whether the time cost operates in the same way as the monetary cost. To 
facilitate a comparison between the monetary cost and the time cost, we introduce two distinct 
time cost treatments. The Unannounced Time Cost treatment parallels everyday life where the 
time cost is usually unknown at the beginning of search. In this treatment, no information about 
time delay is provided and the instructions are identical to the No Cost treatment. In the 
Unannounced Time Cost treatment, the search behavior can therefore be influenced by the 
presence of the time cost and the ability to infer the time cost as it is being experienced while 
searching for another offer. We conjecture that this environment will dampen the shortening 
effect of time delay on search.  
 
7 A description of a house, consisting of the floor area, the number of bedrooms, suburb and the year the house 
was built in, is presented at the beginning of the round, prior to any price offer. To enhance the link between the  
experiment and the outside-the-lab world, the house descriptions presented to participants were taken from houses 
sold in 12 different suburbs in Christchurch, New Zealand during October 2014. All information was obtained 
from the Quotable Value Limited database (qv.co.nz). The effect of context and additional context-relevant 
information is explored in a companion paper (Hsiao et al. 2020). We find that that framing a sequential search 
problem as selling houses leads to longer search and higher earnings than a context-free frame. Manipulating 
whether or not the framed decision-making scenario includes a description of the house, which would be naturally 
available in a real estate market, does not impact the search length or the total earnings. 
8 The data from the No Cost treatment are also reported in Hsiao et al., 2020 (House with Info treatment).  
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To identify the net effect of time cost, our design includes the Announced Time Cost treatment, 
in which participants are instructed that there is a 5-second time delay prior to presenting each 
offer. Announcing the presence and size of the time cost before the search begins means that 
the participants do not need to infer it as they make their decisions. The Announced Time Cost 
treatment is therefore directly comparable with the Monetary Cost treatment, the presence and 
size of which are also announced before the search commences.  
The parameterization of costs implemented in the Monetary Cost treatment (20 ECUs) and 
both time cost treatments (a 5-second delay) was calibrated to facilitate their comparison. In 
general, the opportunity cost of time depends on the maximum payment rate a participant can 
earn. (We assume the participants had no other better paying alternative since they decided to 
attend the experiment). The experiment is parameterized to yield a maximum payment of $14, 
which is also used to calibrate the opportunity cost of time (this information was not revealed 
to participants). Using the implemented exchange rate ($1 =1000 ECUs), a 5-second delay 
experienced in both cost treatments thus equals approximately 2 cents ($14*5/3600 seconds) 
or 20 ECUs, i.e. an equivalent of the cost incurred by the participants in the Monetary Cost 
treatment. 
In both time cost treatments, the time delay is implemented identically – each participant must 
wait five seconds before a new offer is displayed on the screen. Similar to the monetary cost, 
the time cost is also cumulative, meaning the more offers the participant searches through, the 
longer he/she has to wait in total. For example, if a participant accepts the 20th offer for a house, 
the total delay is 20 x 5 seconds = 100 seconds. Therefore, the 5-seconds time delay can 
cumulatively yield a significant waiting time.9 This was indeed the case as the Unannounced 
Time Cost treatment session in the present experiment lasted on average 15 minutes longer 
(approximately one hour and 10 minutes) than the No Cost treatment session (55 minutes). The 
Announced Time Cost treatment session lasted on average one hour. The Monetary Cost 
treatment session lasted 45 minutes. (Note that the actual time duration is also a function of the 
observed search length, our dependent variable.)  
An important feature of the experimental protocol was that in all treatments the participants 
received their earnings after everyone completed the experiment, keeping the procedures 
constant across treatments. Our conservative design therefore detects the lower bound of the 
effect of time cost on search behavior. If the participants were able to leave the experiment 
early, the effect of the time cost would likely be more pronounced. However, having 
participants depart at their own pace is easily observable by others, introducing a potential 
confound in behavior. For example, an early departure might be interpreted by other 
participants as a signal that a short search is a “better” strategy, resulting in a loss of control 
over the data generating process. The implemented design controls for such eventuality.10 One 
might also think that having more time when waiting for a new offer (and thus also 
cumulatively) in both time cost treatments could yield better decisions. 11  To address this 
potential concern, we opted to not impose a time limit on participants’ decisions in any of the 
 
9 In a pilot session, we trialed a 10-second delay. During the session that lasted three hours, many participants 
dropped out. Subsequently, we recalibrated the Unannounced and Announced Time Cost treatments to a 5-second 
delay. No participant dropped out of the experiment in either treatment under the new parameterization.  
10 The interaction of the amount of search with the opportunity cost of time is an interesting question in its own 
right and could be explored, for example by allowing the participants to leave the lab as in Knowles and Servátka 
(2015) or introducing a parallel task, e.g. watching videos (Kamei & Markussen, 2019) or browsing the internet. 
We leave this exploration for future research. 
11 For an example of how time pressure can affect decisions see Kocher, Pahlke and Trautmann (2013). 
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treatments; i.e. they could take as long as they needed to evaluate each offer that was presented 
to them.  
A total of 188 undergraduate students from the University of Canterbury in Christchurch, New 
Zealand participated in the experiment; 48 in the No Cost treatment, 44 in the Monetary Cost 
treatment, 43 in the Unannounced Time Cost treatment, and 53 in the Announced Time Cost 
treatment. The participants were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) and earned 12.20 New 
Zealand Dollars (NZD) on average. No specific information regarding experimental earnings 
was provided in the invitation email. The payoff protocol was single-blind, meaning that the 
experimenter was able to track participant decisions to their identity. The search task was 
implemented using z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). 
After arriving at the lab, the participants were randomly assigned to a cubicle and read the 
instructions (provided in Appendix A.1 – 3) at their own pace. Any questions were answered 
in private. Upon completion of the experiment, all participants were privately paid their 
earnings for the session. 
 
4. HYPOTHESES AND BENCHMARK SIMULATIONS  
What is the optimal decision rule for a payoff-maximizing risk-neutral decision maker in our 
implemented variation of the secretary problem? As the offers come from an unknown 
distribution, we conduct a simulation that allows us to evaluate the performance of different 
decision rules in our treatments and to derive a benchmark prediction for the impact of search 
cost on search behavior. Each simulation compares the payoffs resulting from 20 different 
decision rules, each of which prescribes how many offers to reject, followed by accepting the 
next highest offer (see Figure 1 for details). For example, the rule “Accept the next highest 
offer after seeing the first 2 offers” means that a participant always rejects the first two offers. 
He then keeps searching and does not stop until the encounters an offer that is higher than the 
first two offers he rejected (thus also higher than all offers he has observed up to that point). 
Each simulation iteration randomly draws a set of 20 random offers from each of 10 uniform 
distributions that we use to generate offers in the experiment, representing 10 houses in 
different suburbs. The simulation runs separately for each house. We provide more details on 
simulation procedures in Appendix C. 
To compare the performance of decision rules across treatments we run the simulation using 
the search cost of 0 (representing the No Cost treatment) and 20 ECUs (representing all cost 
treatments). We compare the performance of all 20 possible decision rules with and without 
costs using the average payoff (in ECUs) they yield. The average payoff represents the average 
value earned from accepting an offer according to a given decision rule net of the cumulative 
search cost.  
It is trivial to see that, due to the accumulation of search costs, every decision rule yields a 
higher payoff if there is no cost (0 ECU) than if the cost is 20 ECUs (see Figure 1). According 
to the simulation, the decision rule that prescribes to “Accept the next highest offer after seeing 
the first 4 offers” yields the highest payoff if there is no cost whereas with costs the optimal 
decision rule is to always “Accept the next highest offer after seeing the first offer”. The 
simulation thus suggests that in this environment, it is optimal to stop the search sooner (i.e., 
accept an earlier offer) when the search is costly as compared to a situation when it is not. This 
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is due to the cumulative nature of the search cost which, given this parameterization, causes 
the overall payoff to decrease if one searches for more than one offer.  
Simulation result: In the presence of search cost it is optimal to search less than in a situation 




Figure 1. The total average payoff for all decision rules for the costs of 0 ECU and 20 
ECUs 
 
Based on the simulation results and in line with previous research, we conjecture that 
participants will search less in the presence of the monetary cost than when there is no search 
cost. Without the cost, the decision rule to “Accept the next highest offer after seeing the first 
4 offers” yields the highest total payoff, achieved by stopping at Position 10. With the cost, the 
decision rule to “Accept the next highest offer after seeing the first offer” yields the highest 
total payoff, achieved by stopping at Position 6.  
While we have calibrated the monetary cost to be nominally equivalent to the time cost, we 
formulate our behavioral hypotheses based on the previous literature suggesting that monetary 
costs tend to be more salient or at least equivalent to time costs. Although we anticipate the 
effect of the announced and unannounced time cost to be weaker than the effect of the monetary 
cost, we expect both time costs to influence the search length relative to the situation where 
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In line with the above argument regarding the saliency of costs, if both monetary and time costs 
are announced, we expect the monetary cost to have a stronger impact on the search length. 
This leads to a hypothesis that search will be shorter in the presence of the monetary cost than 
in the presence of the announced time cost. Further, we conjecture that the need to infer the 
presence of time delay associated with every new offer will diminish the effect of the time cost, 
leading to shorter search if the time cost is announced than when it is unannounced. The above 
conjectures thus yield the following testable hypothesis regarding the search length (as 
measured by the average stopping position).  
 
Hypothesis (Average stopping position):  No Cost > Unannounced Time Cost > Announced 
Time Cost > Monetary Cost 
 
5. RESULTS 
5.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 displays the summary statistics for the key variables measuring search behavior and its 
outcomes across treatments.12 The stopping position, measured as the position in the sequence 
where a participant accepts an offer, represents the search length (the higher the stopping 
position, the longer the search.) The average accepted offer measures the economic outcome 
of search behavior but does not take the monetary cost into consideration. We thus also 
calculate the total payoff which subtracts the cumulative monetary search cost from the 
accepted offers. This variable is relevant for the Monetary Cost treatment but does not consider 
the incurred time cost in the time cost treatments. The time cost is included in calculating the 
total profit across all treatments, assuming the opportunity cost of time in the time cost 
treatments is equivalent to the calibrated monetary cost.  
 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
Variables Treatment 




Cost Monetary Cost  
Simulation benchmark     
Stopping position 10 (6, 10) (6, 10) 6 
Behavior    
Average stopping 
position 11.58 (2.77) 10.42 (2.15) 9.37 (2.77) 6.37 (3.5) 
Average accepted offer 733.89 (58.07) 738.79 (43.63) 734.29 (41.34) 673.23 (89.92) 
Total payoff 7338.85 (580.71) 7387.86 (436.28) 7342.95 (413.42) 5459.16 (777.59) 
Total profit 7338.85 (580.71) 5303.67 (461.97) 5468.96 (466.56) 5459.16 (777.59) 
N 48 43 53 44 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
 
12 For the summary statistics (i.e., the mean and standard deviation), we compute the average for each individual 
first and use each average as a single observation.  
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Table 2:  Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests for pair-wise comparisons between treatments  
  Comparisons 





No Cost vs. 
Announced 
Time Cost 












Average stopping position <0.001 <0.001 0.011 0.039 <0.001 
Average accepted offer <0.001 0.656 0.824 0.477 <0.001 
Total payoff <0.001 0.656 0.824 0.477 <0.001 
Total profit <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.121 0.218 
Note: All reported test are two-sided.  
 
Table 2 presents the results of the two-sided Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests between treatments 
for the above described variables. The tests confirm our hypothesis that monetary cost 
decreases the search length. In the No Cost treatment, the average stopping position over 10 
rounds is 11.58. The search length plunges to 6.37 when the search involves a monetary cost 
of 20 ECUs for every additional offer, with the difference being statistically significant. We 
find that time costs shorten the search length as well. The average stopping position is equal to 
10.42 when the time cost is unannounced and 9.37 when the time cost is announced. The 
differences in search length between each of the time cost treatments and the No Cost treatment 
as well as between the two time cost treatments themselves are statistically significant. 
Participants also search significantly less in the presence of the monetary cost than in the 
presence of the time costs (announced and unannounced), with both differences being 
statistically significant. Taken together, the above results imply the time cost shortens search 
but not as much as the monetary cost does. The results also indicate that participants are able 
to infer the unannounced time cost, but the inference is imperfect. 
Result 1 (Average stopping position): No Cost > Unannounced Time Cost > Announced 
Time Cost > Monetary Cost 
We find that the reduced search length is associated with lower accepted offers in the Monetary 
Cost treatment, but not in the two time cost treatments. In the No Cost treatment, the average 
accepted offer is 733.89, which is not statistically different from 738.9 or 734.29 in the 
Unannounced and Announced Time Cost treatments, respectively. The average accepted offer 
in the Monetary Cost treatment is only 673.23, which is significantly lower than that the 
average accepted offer in all three other treatments.  
Result 2 (Average accepted offer): No Cost = Unannounced Time Cost = Announced Time 
Cost > Monetary Cost 
Next, we examine the total payoff, which is calculated as the sum of accepted offers in all 10 
rounds minus the monetary costs (if incurred). The total payoff in the No Cost treatment is 
7338.85, which is not statistically significantly different from 7387.86 and 7342.95 in the 
Unannounced Time Cost and Announced Time Cost treatments, respectively. Due to the lowest 
accepted offers and the incurred monetary costs, the total payoff of 5459.16 in the Monetary 
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Cost treatment is statistically significantly lower than the total payoff in all the other three 
treatments. 
Result 3 (Total payoff): No Cost = Unannounced Time Cost = Announced Time Cost > 
Monetary Cost 
One caveat of the total payoff is that it does not take into account the opportunity cost of time 
delay. Therefore, we generate the total profit statistic that subtracts the calibrated monetary 
value of the experienced cumulative time delay from the accepted offers. For example, if in the 
Announced and Unannounced Time Cost treatments the 19th offer of 500 ECUs is accepted, 
the profit for that round equals 500 ECUs – (19×20 ECUs) = 120 ECUs, as the participant has 
to wait for 19 x 5 seconds and the opportunity cost of each 5-second delay is 20 ECUs. (The 
total profit then sums the profits for all 10 rounds.) In the Monetary Cost treatment, if the 19th 
offer of 500 ECUs is accepted, the profit equals the payoff, i.e. 500 ECUs − (19 × 20 ECUs) = 
120 ECUs. Thus, for the same offer in the same position, the Unannounced Time Cost, 
Announced Time Cost, and Monetary Cost treatments should yield the same profit. Based on 
our calibrated monetary value of the time cost, we find that the total profit yields 5303.67 in 
the Unannounced Time Cost treatment and 5468.96 in the Announced Time Cost treatment, 
both of which are statistically significantly lower than in the total profit the No Cost treatment. 
However, neither the differences between the Monetary Cost and the two time cost treatments 
nor the difference between the Announced and Unannounced Time Cost treatments themselves 
are statistically significant. 
Result 4 (Total profit): No Cost > Unannounced Time Cost = Announced Time Cost = 
Monetary Cost  
All presented results are also robust with respect to the rank of the accepted offer within the 
inspected offers as well as within all offers. The details are available upon request. 
 
5.2 Regression analysis 
We also conduct a regression analysis to verify the robustness of our results. We find that all 
non-parametric test results are confirmed. In the absence of time or monetary costs, participants 
search through 11.58 offers on average. Compared to the No Cost treatment, the search length 
decreases by 5.21 when a monetary cost is involved. Participants also shorten their search by 
1.16 with the unannounced time cost and further 1.05 if the time cost is announced. The average 
accepted offer is 733.89 in the No Cost treatment and decreases by 69.65 in the Monetary Cost 
treatment, with the difference being statistically significant. The difference between the No 
Cost treatment and each of the two time cost treatments as well as between the two time costs 
themselves are also statistically insignificant. Because of the monetary cost of 20 ECUs in the 
Monetary Cost treatment, the total payoff decreases by 187.97, which is also statistically 
significant. If we take the equivalent monetary value of time cost into account, the total profit 
is reduced by 203.52 in the Time Cost treatment. The difference in the total profit between the 





Table 3: OLS regressions 











-1.16** 4.90 49.01 -2035.18*** 
(0.518) (10.699) (106.989) (109.462) 
Time cost is announced 
-1.05** -4.49 -44.94 165.29* 
(0.502) (8.747) (87.467) (95.238) 
Monetary Cost 
-5.21*** -60.65*** -1879.69*** -1879.69*** 
(0.662) (15.930) (144.051) (144.051) 
Constant 
11.58*** 733.89*** 7338.85*** 7338.85*** 
(0.400) (8.384) (83.838) (83.838) 
N 188 188 188 188 
Adjust R2 0.302 0.149 0.668 0.676 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%-
level, respectively. Monetary cost =1 for Monetary Cost and =0 otherwise. Time cost =1 for Announced Time 
Cost and Unannounced Time Cost and =0 otherwise. Time cost is announced =1 for Announced Time Cost and 
=0 otherwise.  
 
Experience and Learning 
Does experience (learning over time) improve search behavior over time? Figure 2 displays 
participants’ search behavior (stopping position, accepted offers, payoff, and profit) over time, 
separately for each treatment. The fluctuations in Figure 2 are driven mainly by the price 
distributions of different suburbs (i.e. each round). We thus add the price of the first offer in 
each round as a proxy for the distribution in the OLS regression with time trend variable (Table 
4). We find that participants search more over time, and their search yields higher offers, 





Note: NC = No Cost; UTC = Unannounced Time Cost; MC = Monetary Cost; ATC = Announced Time Cost. 
 






Table 4: Regression analysis with the learning effect 




Price of accepted 
offers Payoff  Profit  
Time cost 
-1.156** 4.901 4.901 -203.518*** 
(0.514) (10.627) (10.627) (10.872) 
Time cost is announced 
-1.051** -4.494 -4.494 16.529* 
(0.499) (8.688) (8.688) (9.460) 
Monetary cost 
-5.211*** -60.651*** -187.970*** -187.970*** 
(0.658) (15.823) (14.308) (14.308) 
1st Offer -0.009*** 0.487*** 0.514*** 0.609*** 
  (0.001) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) 
Round 0.167*** 5.354*** 4.160*** 2.691*** 
  (0.038) (0.725) (0.802) (1.018) 
Constant 14.862*** 483.087*** 477.422*** 442.239*** 
  (0.545) (11.761) (11.631) (12.300) 
N 1880 1880 1880 1880 
Adjust R2 0.152 0.189 0.273 0.250 
 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%-
level, respectively. Monetary cost =1 for Monetary Cost and =0 otherwise. Time cost =1 for Announced Time 
Cost and Unannounced Time Cost and =0 otherwise. Time cost is announced =1 for Announced Time Cost and 




Life is full of examples where people sequentially search through available alternatives: 
looking for a new job, trying to hire an employee, or selling and buying various items. 
Reviewing new offers is often costly not only in monetary terms but also timewise. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that people sometimes ignore or underappreciate the time they devote to 
search, resulting in suboptimal decisions, such as searching too long especially if the 
opportunity cost of their time is high. 
In this paper, we investigate the effect of time and monetary costs in a search problem framed 
as selling houses. As the participants search from an unknown distribution, we conduct 
simulations to derive a prediction that a (monetary) search cost leads to shorter search. To 
empirically compare the effect of the monetary cost with the time cost effect, we calibrate the 
time delay experienced when waiting for a new offer to reflect the opportunity cost of our 
participants. The two types of costs also vary in another dimension. While the monetary cost 
is often known (or could easily be verified) before the search commences, the time cost rarely 
enters the decision-making process and becomes more salient only after experiencing it. Our 
experimental design therefore also separates the time cost effect from people’s (in)ability to 
perceive time delay between subsequent offers. Being able to identify these two effects has 
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implications for theoretical modeling of search behavior and providing practical 
recommendations.  
Our experiment confirms the hypothesis that participants search less when time and monetary 
costs are involved; however, the monetary cost decreases search by more than the time cost. 
The finding suggests that the time cost is less salient than the monetary cost in search decisions. 
We also find that the announced time cost decreases search by more than the unannounced time 
cost, signifying that participants infer the time delay imperfectly. The shorter search observed 
in the presence of monetary cost results in a lower total payoff, which is not the case when with 
either the announced or unannounced time cost. However, if we consider the equivalent 
monetary value of time cost, both announced and unannounced time costs reduce the profit to 
the same degree as the monetary cost does. We find no statistically significant differences 
between announced and unannounced time costs in terms of the total profit.  
There are at least three potential underlying causes for the difference between the observed 
amount of search in the presence of time and monetary costs. First, the perceived value of 
participants’ time might not equal their actual opportunity cost of time (at least the way we 
calibrated and used it in the time cost treatments). Some previous research also reports that 
money and time are processed differently (Lee, Lee, Bertini, Zauberman & Ariely, 2015). 
Second, the implemented framing of selling houses might have interacted with the perception 
of time cost (and its monetary value as calculated in the Monetary Cost treatment). This second 
explanation is in line with the finding that different frames can elicit systematically different 
decisions (e.g. Tversky & Kahneman, 1981); in some cases, people make better decisions with 
framing than without (e.g. Hsiao, Kemp & Servátka, 2020). Housing is usually associated with 
positive images (e.g. comfort, security, childhood memories) and when something is being 
perceived more positively, it may also be perceived as more important and more worth doing 
(e.g. the halo effect in Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Kahneman, 2011). Hence, people may be 
inclined to invest more time and therefore search longer than they would if only the monetary 
payoffs were considered as in a context-free experiment or in our simulation. Finally, similar 
to what the previous studies suggested (e.g., Okada & Hoch, 2004; Soman, 2001; Lilley & 
Slonim, 2014; Brown, Meer & Williams, 2019), people may be more willing to spend time 
rather than money due to the intrinsic difference and possibly also because money can stored 
or saved for future use, which is not possible with time. 
Our research opens possibilities for future extensions and robustness checks. In many 
situations, recalling a previously rejected offer is possible. There exists evidence that people 
are willing to search longer when recall is allowed, both with and without monetary search cost 
(Zwick et al., 2003). It would therefore be useful to examine whether the effect of time cost on 
search behavior persists also after allowing for recall. In a similar fashion, the impact of time 
search cost can vary with the opportunity cost of time (Knowles & Servátka, 2015). Another 
interesting extension would separate the perception of time delay from incorporating the 
awareness about the time cost in the decision-making process. A study of this type calls for 
interdisciplinary approach, perhaps combining experiments with neuroscience methods. We 
leave these explorations for future research.  
18 
 
Our findings have important implications for improving the quality of decisions in unfamiliar 
or infrequently encountered situations, e.g. buying or selling houses. These sequential 
decisions can be associated with sizeable financial consequences and people often do not have 
the opportunity to “practice” before making the decision. Knowing that both time and monetary 
costs can contribute to sub-optimal decision-making, may help people take preventive 
measures (e.g. planning ahead on the number of searches one will conduct before making 
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Instructions for the no cost and unannounced time cost treatments (the instructions were 
identical in both cases; the treatments differed only in the 5 second time delay imposed in the 




You are about to participate in a decision-making experiment. If you follow these instructions 
carefully you may earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash at 
the end of the experiment. If you have a question at any time, please raise your hand and the 
experimenter will approach you and answer your question in private. We ask that you not to 
talk otherwise during the experiment. Also, please turn off your cellphone and do not use the 
computer for any other purpose than your participation in the experiment requires. If you break 







You will participate in 10 scenarios, in which you will be selling houses. In each scenario, you 
will be asked to decide whether to accept or reject a price offer for a particular house. You will 
be given a brief description of the house that will be followed by a series of price offers. The 
price offers are randomly generated by the computer and available one at a time. Once a price 
offer is presented, you can either accept or reject it. If you accept the price offer, the house will 
be sold at the price you accepted. All sales are final. If you reject the price offer, the offer will 
disappear; you cannot go back to the previously rejected offer. In total there are 20 price offers 
available for each house; if you have not accepted an offer prior to the 20th offer, you will be 
forced to accept the 20th (i.e. the final) offer. Therefore, make your decisions carefully. 
 
There is no time limit on how long the price offers will be available for, so take as long as you 
need to evaluate each offer. 
 
Practice scenarios 
There will be two practice scenarios. These practice scenarios are there to help you become 
familiar with the software. You will not be paid for the decisions you make in these two practice 
scenarios. 
 
How payoffs are determined 
The payoffs will be denoted in experimental currency units (ECUs). 
 
1000 ECUs = 1 NZD 
 
Your ECUs will be converted into NZD at this rate, and you will be paid in NZD when you 
leave the lab. The more ECUs you earn, the more NZD you earn.  
 
Your payoffs are determined as follows: 
 
Total ECUs you earn 
= 
Accepted price offer for House 1 + Accepted price offer for House 2 + ….+ Accepted price 
offer for House 10 
 
Example: Suppose you accepted the price offer 450 for House 1, 260 for House 2, 380 for 
House 3,…, 658 for House 10. The total amount of ECUs you earn is 450+260+380+…. +658. 
 
Do you have any questions? 
You are now ready to begin the experiment. First, we will conduct two practice scenarios, with 








You are about to participate in a decision-making experiment. If you follow these instructions 
carefully you may earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash at 
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You will participate in 10 scenarios, in which you will be selling houses. In each scenario, you 
will be asked to decide whether to accept or reject a price offer for a particular house. You will 
be given a brief description of the house that will be followed by a series of price offers. The 
price offers are randomly generated by the computer and available one at a time. There is a five 
second waiting time before presenting each offer. Once a price offer is presented, you can either 
accept or reject it. If you accept the price offer, the house will be sold at the price you accepted. 
All sales are final. If you reject the price offer, the offer will disappear; you cannot go back to 
the previously rejected offer. In total there are 20 price offers available for each house; if you 
have not accepted an offer prior to the 20th offer, you will be forced to accept the 20th (i.e. the 
final) offer. Therefore, make your decisions carefully. 
 
There is no time limit on how long the price offers will be available for, so take as long as you 
need to evaluate each offer. 
 
Practice scenarios 
There will be two practice scenarios. These practice scenarios are there to help you become 
familiar with the software. You will not be paid for the decisions you make in these two practice 
scenarios. 
 
How payoffs are determined 
The payoffs will be denoted in experimental currency units (ECUs). 
 
1000 ECUs = 1 NZD 
 
Your ECUs will be converted into NZD at this rate, and you will be paid in NZD when you 
leave the lab. The more ECUs you earn, the more NZD you earn.  
 
Your payoffs are determined as follows: 
 
Total ECUs you earn 
= 
Accepted price offer for House 1 + Accepted price offer for House 2 + ….+ Accepted price 
offer for House 10 
 
Example: Suppose you accepted the price offer 450 for House 1, 260 for House 2, 380 for 
House 3,…, 658 for House 10. The total amount of ECUs you earn is 450+260+380+…. +658. 
 
Do you have any questions? 
You are now ready to begin the experiment. First, we will conduct two practice scenarios, with 









You are about to participate in a decision-making experiment. If you follow these instructions 
carefully you may earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash at 
the end of the experiment. If you have a question at any time, please raise your hand and the 
experimenter will approach you and answer your question in private. We ask that you not to 
talk otherwise during the experiment. Also, please turn off your cellphone and do not use the 
computer for any other purpose than your participation in the experiment requires. If you break 







You will participate in 10 scenarios, in which you will be selling houses. In each scenario, you 
will be asked to decide whether to accept or reject a price offer for a particular house. You will 
be given a brief description of the house that will be followed by a series of price offers, denoted 
in experimental currency units (ECUs). The price offers are randomly generated by the 
computer and available one at a time. Once a price offer is presented, you can either accept or 
reject it. If you accept the price offer, the house will be sold at the price you accepted. All sales 
are final. If you reject the price offer, the offer will disappear; you cannot go back to the 
previously rejected offer. In total, there are 20 price offers available for each house; if you have 
not accepted an offer prior to the 20th offer, you will be forced to accept the 20th (i.e. the final) 
offer. For inspecting each price offer you will incur a cost of 20 ECUs. Therefore, make your 
decisions carefully. 
 
There is no time limit on how long the price offers will be available for, so take as long as you 
need to evaluate each offer. 
 
Practice scenarios 
There will be two practice scenarios. These practice scenarios are there to help you become 
familiar with the software. You will not be paid for the decisions you make in these two practice 
scenarios. 
 
How payoffs are determined 
The payoffs will be denoted in experimental currency units (ECUs). 
 
1000 ECUs = 1 NZD 
 
Your ECUs will be converted into NZD at this rate, and you will be paid in NZD when you 
leave the lab. The more ECUs you earn, the more NZD you earn.  
 
Your payoffs are determined as follows: 
 
Total ECUs you earn 
= 
(Accepted price offer for House 1- 20 ECUs * the number of inspected offers for House 1) + 
(Accepted price offer for House 2 – 20 ECUs * the number of inspected offers for House 2) 
+ …. + (Accepted price offer for House 10 – 20 ECUs * the number of inspected offers for 
House 10) 
 
Example: Suppose you accepted the 3rd price offer for House 1 and the price offer has a value 
of 450, the 4th price offer for House 2 with a value of 260, the 1st offer for House 3 with a value 
of 500,….., the 5th price offer for House 10 with a value of 658. The total amount of ECUs you 
earn is (450 - 20*3) + (260 - 20*4) + (500 - 20*1) +…. + (658 - 20*5). 
 
Do you have any questions? 
 
You are now ready to begin the experiment. First, we will conduct two practice scenarios, with 





Table 5: The actual price offers sequences used in the experiment 
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Offer 
1 388 739 310 420 292 494 522 252 789 341 
2 488 803 290 637 264 225 252 709 829 459 
3 683 221 637 727 344 272 562 966 996 453 
4 321 729 372 561 266 994 255 885 241 625 
5 625 159 619 643 396 602 370 737 799 504 
6 744 150 207 663 445 987 292 449 722 387 
7 279 299 455 568 266 523 533 910 1088 250 
8 848 818 400 636 241 683 237 250 876 308 
9 276 585 251 422 370 1400 262 933 503 492 
10 678 875 708 336 484 1574 343 491 650 455 
11 408 130 452 414 264 1413 220 450 890 353 
12 435 795 516 479 186 184 460 394 1264 588 
13 679 481 420 332 578 1081 294 899 645 438 
14 465 2 607 494 244 558 535 372 1740 408 
15 393 525 410 546 189 273 297 505 1179 481 
16 397 429 324 724 565 1182 452 608 250 467 
17 588 62 214 411 271 305 284 827 840 418 
18 358 459 480 267 235 661 436 712 272 273 
19 644 748 463 357 350 785 581 838 449 554 
20 495 374 617 733 373 89 197 541 105 553 
Each sequence of offers, including those in the practice rounds, was generated in MS Excel by 
randomly sampling from an interval of the average house price (in thousands of NZD) in a 
different Christchurch suburb plus/minus the standard deviation for that suburb.13 The house 
transactions took place in October 2014. The transaction information was obtained from the 








Simulations and Hypotheses 
The simulations are run using Processing 3 (version 3.02) software.14 A total of 20 
decision rules containing all possible stopping positions (1 to 20) is evaluated. 
Each simulation cycle generates a set of 20 random offers. Decision rule 0 is to accept 
the first offer regardless of the value; decision rule 1 means to reject the first offer and choose 
the next highest offer, decision rule 2 refers to reject the first two offers and choose the next 
highest offer and so on. Decision rule 19 is to accept the 20th/final offer regardless of the value. 
The simulation runs separately for each house.  
The simulation yields the average payoffs in ECUs of each decision rule when there are 
0 and 20 ECUs. The average payoff gives an indication of which decision rule is the optimal, 
i.e., yields the highest payoff, when all offers yield a positive payoff. The simulation results of 
the total average payoff show that in 0 ECU, the optimal decision rule is“Accept the next 
highest after seeing 4”, which is to reject the first four offers, then accept the next highest offer. 
The total payoff starts to decrease if one chooses a decision rule after this, resulting an optimal 
stopping position at the 10th offer. The optimal decision rule is to “Accept the next highest offer 
after seeing the first offer” when there is 20 ECUs, which yields the highest payoff than all the 
other decision rules tested. 
 
 
14 Processing is free to download at https://processing.org/. 
